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            <ITEXT CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
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            <ITEXT CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Res­pon­sible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="New Style"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the hu­man can have the “I” in his re­pre­sen­ta­tions raises him in­fi­ni­te­ly above all other li­ving beings on earth. Be­cause of this he is a per­son’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Im­ma­nuel Kants cen­tral as­ser­tions in An­thro­po­lo­gy. In the in­tro­duc­tion of the same work he states: ‘But the most im­por­tant ob­ject in the world to which he can ap­ply [(his) ac­qui­red know­ledge and skill] is the hu­man being: be­cause the hu­man being is his own fi­nal end. — The­re­fore to know the hu­man being ac­cor­ding to his spe­cies as an earth­ly being en­do­wed with rea­son es­pe­cial­ly de­serves to be cal­led know­ledge of the world, even though he consti­tutes on­ly one part of the crea­tures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Fi­nal­ly, in An­thro­po­lo­gy we read, ‘Phy­sio­lo­gi­cal know­ledge of the hu­man being concerns the in­ves­ti­ga­tion of what na­ture makes of the hu­man being, prag­ma­tic, the in­ves­ti­ga­tion of what he as a free-ac­ting being makes of him­self, or can and should make of him­self’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The ca­pa­ci­ty for self-awa­re­ness Kant iden­ti­fies here, this ca­pa­ci­ty to re­late to him­self, the fact that he is both sub­ject and ob­ject of his know­ledge and ac­tions, forms the ba­sis of his pro­po­sed ethi­cal prac­tice. Thanks to this ca­pa­ci­ty for self-awa­re­ness, we can ana­lyse our­selves and stu­dy the fac­tors that shape our be­ha­viour, be­fore ta­king control of our own lives and ac­cep­ting res­pon­si­bi­li­ty for our be­ha­viour. That is how we as­sert our­selves as mo­ral sub­jects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Ac­cor­ding to Kant, the hu­man spe­cies pos­sesses the ca­pa­ci­ty for dis­tan­cing it­self from the fac­tors – more or less an­cho­red in na­ture – that shape man’s be­ha­viour, so that man can bring his ac­tions in­to line with free­ly cho­sen norms and tar­gets. The mo­ral sub­ject, cal­led the ‘per­son’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concer­ned, be go­ver­ned by ethi­cal prin­ciples. Al­though the per­son is sha­ped by a thou­sand and one fac­tors, Kant be­lieves there is en­ough free­dom left on which to base a sense of res­pon­si­bi­li­ty. This ample free­dom forms the foun­da­tion for man’s ethics. Next, he for­mu­lates an ethi­cal task: the per­son, whom he sees as an au­to­no­mous, ra­tio­nal and ac­coun­table sub­ject, must constant­ly cri­tique his own ac­tions and eva­luate them against the Law of Rea­son."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Na­ture has willed that man should pro­duce en­ti­re­ly by his own ini­tia­tive eve­ry­thing which goes beyond the me­cha­ni­cal or­de­ring of his ani­mal exis­tence’ (‘Idea for a Uni­ver­sal His­to­ry …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does eve­ry­thing by his own ef­forts, we shall see, ac­cor­ding to Kant, how in the long term even the see­min­gly most ran­dom pro­cesses will be­come re­gu­lar and constant. This leads to the reas­su­ring thought that people, pre­ci­se­ly when they choose to fol­low their own as op­po­sed to ano­ther’s path, are in­ad­ver­tent­ly gui­ded by na­ture. They then unin­ten­tio­nal­ly sup­port so­me­thing that, if they were aware of it, they would care lit­tle for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one ano­ther when they em­bo­dy their sub­jec­tive free­dom, but at the same time they will be cal­led upon to dis­ci­pline them­selves right across the na­tu­ral or­der of contra­dic­tions and va­rious forms of sel­fish self-in­vol­ve­ment. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its ori­gins in evil. For this rea­son, evil can be ac­cep­ted and de­fen­ded, and this consti­tutes the core of the pro­fane theo­di­cy Kant de­ve­lops in his text. He as­sumes there is an unin­ten­tio­nal, un­plan­ned com­ponent em­bed­ded in hu­man ac­tion. On that, he be­lieves, we can base the hope that there is a se­cret me­cha­nism at work in na­ture that will lead to a ba­lance in hu­man so­cie­ty. Des­pite the ma­ny de­tours re­sul­ting from the ci­vil rights of free­dom and equa­li­ty, there will be a ‘re­gu­lar pro­cess of im­pro­ve­ment’, which Kant be­lie­ved was confir­med by the French Re­vo­lu­tion (‘The Contest of Fa­cul­ties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant re­con­ciles, in the form of ‘conjec­tures ba­sed on rea­son’ or ‘pro­phe­cies of hu­man beings’ des­ti­ny’, the ma­ni­fest ran­dom­ness of hu­man af­fairs with a jus­ti­fi­ca­tion by na­ture. He be­lieves the mea­ning of his his­to­ri­cal pro­po­si­tion lies in the mo­ral ef­fects of the pro­mise that in the fu­ture free­dom and the vic­to­ry of good over evil will go hand in hand. The his­to­ri­cal fra­me­work thus helps him ground hu­man res­pon­si­bi­li­ty in the free­dom of sub­jec­ti­vi­ty. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant de­ve­lo­ped this phi­lo­so­phy be­cause he wants to see the state of na­ture and the law of the jungle make way for rea­so­nable or­der and the Law of Rea­son. The lat­ter are the op­po­site of a na­ture that Kant no lon­ger re­gards as a rea­so­nable or­de­ring, as was the case in An­ti­qui­ty, the Middle Ages and the pre­ce­ding clas­si­cal era. The state of na­ture is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theo­lo­gi­cal thought, that is, a place of vio­lence, was­te­ful­ness and the blind sub­ju­ga­tion of all things to the laws of ne­ces­si­ty. His new rea­so­nable or­der be­gins when the ‘per­son’ comes in­to being and suc­ceeds in tur­ning away from the state of na­ture. Kant then deems the ‘per­son’ free en­ough to es­ta­blish an or­der that is not ba­sed on eve­ry­bo­dy figh­ting eve­ry­bo­dy else, but on an ethos of mu­tual res­pect. Beyond the will to po­wer and the will to use the other – the uni­verse of uti­li­ty – Kant en­vi­sages the pos­si­bi­li­ty of man conclu­ding a pact with the other and mus­te­ring the willin­gness to ac­cept the re­sul­ting li­mi­ta­tions. Ac­cor­ding to Kant’s ethics, the free, his­to­ri­cal sub­ject is ca­pable of de­ve­lo­ping mo­tives for re­noun­cing ins­tant gra­ti­fi­ca­tion and the exer­cise of po­wer. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant al­so argues that the Law of Rea­son must be in­ter­pre­ted not on­ly as a tac­ti­cal ges­ture to se­cure one’s sur­vi­val, but as a ca­te­go­ri­cal im­pe­ra­tive, an un­con­di­tio­nal mo­ral law, which im­poses it­self on us as the ‘voice of conscious­ness’, whe­ther it is in our own in­ter­est or not. It is the his­to­ri­cal sub­ject’s rea­so­na­ble­ness that com­pels him to act in ac­cor­dance with the Law of Rea­son. Ul­ti­ma­te­ly, the bot­tom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achie­ving one’s own ends, but al­so as an end in it­self, to be ap­proa­ched with ac­cep­tance, ack­now­led­ge­ment and res­pect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This com­bi­na­tion of his­to­ri­cal re­pre­sen­ta­tion, concept of man and ethics holds a pro­mise that serves to get people to ac­cept their du­ty to an ‘in­ner mo­ra­li­ty’. His idea that this in­nate qua­li­ty, the good in man, is go­ver­ned by a ‘Di­vine Spark of God’, which gi­ven its depth and na­ture is es­sen­tial­ly beyond the reach of evil, be­trays Kant’s anar­cho-apo­ca­lyp­tic and gnos­tic ins­pi­ra­tion (See Taubes’ com­ments on Kant’s gnos­tic ins­pi­ra­tions in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Cri­ti­cal thin­kers in our day and age doubt whe­ther this his­to­ri­cal and mo­ral sub­jec­ti­vi­ty has any bea­ring on our condi­tion at the start of the third mil­len­nium. Hub Zwart, Dutch me­di­cal ethi­cist and Fou­cault ex­pert, is of the opi­nion that Kant’s thought has no re­le­vance for the dis­content ex­pe­rien­ced in to­day’s tech­no­cra­cy. In terms of spea­king and wri­ting, Kant’s thin­king en­cou­rages rea­so­ning and set­ting out one’s po­si­tion. It ef­fec­ti­ve­ly pro­hi­bits skir­ting around the are­na of ra­tio­nal dia­logue, which has be­come com­mon prac­tice in, for ins­tance, the me­dia and ad­ver­ti­sing. On the other hand, being ty­pi­cal at­tri­butes of mo­ral sub­jec­ti­vi­ty, rea­so­ning and set­ting out one’s po­si­tion have be­come ele­ments of an ins­tru­men­tal-nor­ma­tive, aca­de­mic way of thin­king ai­med at stee­ring people’s be­ha­viour. This type of thin­king the­re­by co­di­fies a prac­tice, which, in most cases, is no­thing other than a prac­tice of main­tai­ning a fine ba­lance bet­ween de­sire and in­ter­dic­tion, and it is doubt­ful whe­ther these forms of ad­dress are still ef­fec­tive in our post­mo­dern me­dia so­cie­ty. Against this, George Ba­taille and la­ter Mi­chel Fou­cault pit­ted a phi­lo­so­phy that mar­gi­na­lises rea­so­na­ble­ness and that can be sum­med up with the concepts as­ce­sis and fire. The first im­pe­ra­tive of this re­ne­wed ap­pre­cia­tion of Kan­tian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the pre­vai­ling re­gime of rea­son! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the in­tro­duc­tion of the confe­rence re­port Das Böse, Jen­seits von Ab­sich­ten und Tä­tern, oder: Ist der Teu­fel ins Sys­tem ein­ge­wan­dert? (Evil, Beyond In­ten­tions and Per­pe­tra­tors, or: Has the De­vil Slip­ped in­to the Sys­tem?, Röt­zer 1995), par­ti­ci­pants of the confe­rence like Wen­zel Ja­cob, Bernd Busch, Diet­mar Kam­per, Flo­rian Röt­zer, Pe­ter Wei­bel and Chris­toph Wulf a.o., won­der whe­ther, in our day and age, we can still be­lieve in Kant’s mo­ral sub­ject or whe­ther we are being suf­fo­ca­ted by a sense of res­pon­si­bi­li­ty that seems to be get­ting more and more ab­surd. We need to be­come more aware of the way mo­dern sys­tems work and de­ve­lop a sys­tems theo­ry, so they sug­gest, in which the res­pon­sible sub­ject is de­cen­tred and mar­gi­na­li­sed. We ought to create the pos­si­bi­li­ty to think in terms of a sys­tem that ope­rates au­to­no­mous­ly and of which the sub­ject is on­ly one (pas­sive) ele­ment. This sys­tem would be so com­plex and work in such a way that mo­ral man, com­pel­led by his free­dom to ful­fil his du­ty, would be­come more and more of a fic­tion in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Au­to­no­mous, self-res­pon­sible man – who was the goal of hu­ma­nism – has long since per­ished in our in­te­gra­ted, and high­ly struc­tu­ra­li­sed, or­ga­ni­sa­tions.’ (1995: p. 17) Psy­cho­tech­no­lo­gy and ra­tio­nal ma­na­ge­ment in­crea­sin­gly ba­nish mat­ters such as res­pon­si­bi­li­ty and com­pe­tence to wha­te­ver nar­row mar­gins re­main. This means that the evil conse­quences of such sys­tems no lon­ger ori­gi­nate in the ma­li­cious intent of a par­ti­cu­lar sub­ject; such an ex­pla­na­tion has, in any event, be­come com­ple­te­ly in­ade­quate. We must as­sume that the com­plex, high le­vel of or­ga­ni­sa­tion in such sys­tems means that even well-mea­ning ac­tions can have harm­ful conse­quences and that some ac­tions can have conse­quences that can­not be known at all. Thanks to these sys­tems there could well be such a thing as unin­ten­tio­nal evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unin­ten­tio­nal evil could be des­cri­bed as the out­come of the ex­tre­me­ly com­plex struc­tures through which so­cie­ty has or­ga­ni­sed both na­ture and people’s lives. Unin­ten­tio­nal evil is a fi­gure of thought cha­rac­te­ri­sed by the re­nun­cia­tion of all the hope (in a Kan­tian sense) that our so­cie­ty has in­ves­ted in the hu­ma­ni­sa­tion of na­ture and the na­tu­ra­li­sa­tion of man over the past two hun­dred years. Such a sys­te­ma­tic evil takes centre stage when the first and se­cond na­tures have, to a large extent, mer­ged. Unin­ten­tio­nal evil thrives on a na­ture that can ba­re­ly be dis­tin­gui­shed from the so­cie­ties that en­gi­neer and control it and that have in­crea­sin­gly in­cor­po­ra­ted it in­to their pro­cesses for en­su­ring sur­vi­val. The oc­cur­rence of an unin­ten­tio­nal sys­tem evil could then be so­me­thing like the late re­venge of a na­ture that has lost its sta­tus of other­ness and now im­poses its laws and or­der on so­cie­ty as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil des­troys. Can this the­sis be re­ver­sed or chal­len­ged? Yes, since no­wa­days we have mo­dern emergent theo­ries that view the tra­di­tio­nal ele­ments of evil, such as chance, ac­ci­dent and er­ror, as ge­ne­ra­tive forces. These theo­ries ac­cept that chance, ac­ci­dent and er­ror are the ma­ni­fes­ta­tions of the crea­tive po­wer of mat­ter. For that rea­son com­plex sys­tems, whose ef­fects and forms can be in­ter­pre­ted with the help of chao­tic pro­cesses, ca­tas­trophes and emer­gen­cies, are in­com­pa­tible with Kant’s ethics and te­leo­lo­gy. When we rea­lise the im­por­tant role that chance – for scien­ti­fic me­ta­phy­sics the most im­por­tant ca­te­go­ry of evil – now plays in mo­dern bio­lo­gy and phy­sics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connec­tion with man’s ac­tions and in­ten­tions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We can­not prevent evil by doing good. Chance, ac­ci­dent and er­ror can­not be so­le­ly in­ter­pre­ted as cor­rup­tio, as si­gns of mo­ral de­cay or of the de­cline of so­me­thing good, as was po­si­ted in the eigh­teenth cen­tu­ry; chance is a fea­ture co­ming from the beyond and fa­tal­ly crosses all concep­tual forms that seek to im­pose or­der on chaos and the cos­mos. For that rea­son alone, it has al­ways been seen as a prin­ciple of evil. Be­cause of the way chance func­tions in our net­work so­cie­ty, in our com­plex, connec­tive and hea­vi­ly in­te­gra­ted sys­tems (the or­ga­ni­sa­tion of la­bour, pro­fes­sio­nal net­works, com­pu­ter net­works, mo­bile phones, the me­dia, etc.), the sub­ject has lit­tle or no control over the ef­fects of his own ac­tions. This fact ren­ders res­pon­si­bi­li­ty mea­nin­gless, while at the same time bur­de­ning us, in­con­tro­ver­ti­bly, with a so­cie­ty that has be­come ef­fec­ti­ve­ly un­go­ver­nable – per­haps pre­ci­se­ly be­cause of this ex­ces­sive in­te­gra­tion. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What in­ter­ests us about this way of thin­king are the theses it ge­ne­rates about the birth of the me­tro­po­lis and the role of ur­ba­nism. Could the un­go­ver­na­bi­li­ty of the mo­dern me­tro­po­lis and its wild mu­ta­tion in­to to­day’s mons­tro­si­ty be the re­sult of the de­ploy­ment of tech­no­lo­gies, or bet­ter still, the side ef­fects of tech­no­lo­gies, that were meant to ‘save’ the ci­ty? The most pro­noun­ced ‘fa­tal’ re­scue ope­ra­tion for doing so has pro­ba­bly been the in­tro­duc­tion of mo­to­ri­sed traf­fic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Ha­ving re­flec­ted on sys­tem er­ror and chance, the par­ti­ci­pants of the confe­rence Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a post­mo­dern stra­te­gy. They plead for ethi­cal in­dif­fe­rence. They plead for a do­main beyond good and evil, where one can ac­ti­vate so­me­thing beyond all in­ten­tion, beyond all plan­ning, beyond any le­gi­ti­ma­tion. We can in­deed ge­ne­rate so­me­thing new here on earth. And this does not re­quire the re­jec­tion of Kant’s ethi­cal dua­lism, since all of our ac­tions, all of our thin­king, de­si­gning, wri­ting and rea­li­sing is ‘ir­res­pon­sible‘ by de­fi­ni­tion, be­cause we can­not avoid being ‘sub­mer­ged’ in the in­for­ma­tion flows. As post­mo­dern cos­mo­po­li­tans we are hy­per-in­for­med, but those ve­ry same flows that in­form us are al­so the flows that make it im­pos­sible for us to trans­cend and ob­tain an over­view of the world. This is why the pro­po­sed ethi­cal in­dif­fe­rence seeks not to in­cite us to neo-Nietz­schean he­roics, but ra­ther to alert us to the tra­gic rea­li­sa­tion that we are doo­med to ir­res­pon­si­bi­li­ty and condem­ned to the last pas­si­vi­ty that per­vades all of post-mo­der­ni­ty: Wha­te­ver we do, our ac­tions are al­ways sha­do­wed by the unin­ten­tio­nal; eve­ry­thing is al­ways dif­ferent than an­ti­ci­pa­ted. Whe­re­ver so­me­thing un­fo­re­seen arises, whe­re­ver so­me­thing hap­pens, whe­re­ver an emer­gence oc­curs, the sys­tem it­self is at work, the sys­tem it­self is the ac­tor, and we… we ex­pe­rience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Uni­ver­sal His­to­ry with a Cos­mo­po­li­tan Pur­pose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Fa­cul­ties’ (1798), in: Kant: Po­li­ti­cal Wri­tings, edi­ted by E.S. Reis, trans­la­ted by H.S. Nis­bet. Cam­bridge: Cam­bridge Uni­ver­si­ty Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., An­thro­po­lo­gy from a Prag­ma­tic Point of View (1798), trans­la­ted and edi­ted by Ro­bert B. Lou­den, with an in­tro­duc­tion by Man­fred Kuehn. Cam­bridge, UK/ New York: Cam­bridge Uni­ver­si­ty Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Röt­zer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jen­seits von Ab­sich­ten und Tä­tern, oder: ist der Teu­fel ins Sys­tem ein­ge­wan­dert? (Evil, Beyond In­ten­tions and Per­pe­tra­tors, or: Has the De­vil Slip­ped in­to the Sys­tem?), Göt­tin­gen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Taubes, J., Oc­ci­den­tal Es­cha­to­lo­gy. Pa­lo Al­to, CA: Stan­ford Uni­ver­si­ty Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Zwart, H., Tech­no­cra­tie en on­be­ha­gen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Mi­chel Fou­cault (Tech­no­cra­cy and its dis­con­tents: the place of ethics in the work of Mi­chel Fou­cault), Ni­j­me­gen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="III. Ap­pen­dix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Res­pon­sible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the hu­man can have the “I” in his re­pre­sen­ta­tions raises him in­fi­ni­te­ly above all other li­ving beings on earth. Be­cause of this he is a per­son’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Im­ma­nuel Kants cen­tral as­ser­tions in An­thro­po­lo­gy. In the in­tro­duc­tion of the same work he states: ‘But the most im­por­tant ob­ject in the world to which he can ap­ply [(his) ac­qui­red know­ledge and skill] is the hu­man being: be­cause the hu­man being is his own fi­nal end. — The­re­fore to know the hu­man being ac­cor­ding to his spe­cies as an earth­ly being en­do­wed with rea­son es­pe­cial­ly de­serves to be cal­led know­ledge of the world, even though he consti­tutes on­ly one part of the crea­tures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Fi­nal­ly, in An­thro­po­lo­gy we read, ‘Phy­sio­lo­gi­cal know­ledge of the hu­man being concerns the in­ves­ti­ga­tion of what na­ture makes of the hu­man being, prag­ma­tic, the in­ves­ti­ga­tion of what he as a free-ac­ting being makes of him­self, or can and should make of him­self’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The ca­pa­ci­ty for self-awa­re­ness Kant iden­ti­fies here, this ca­pa­ci­ty to re­late to him­self, the fact that he is both sub­ject and ob­ject of his know­ledge and ac­tions, forms the ba­sis of his pro­po­sed ethi­cal prac­tice. Thanks to this ca­pa­ci­ty for self-awa­re­ness, we can ana­lyse our­selves and stu­dy the fac­tors that shape our be­ha­viour, be­fore ta­king control of our own lives and ac­cep­ting res­pon­si­bi­li­ty for our be­ha­viour. That is how we as­sert our­selves as mo­ral sub­jects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Ac­cor­ding to Kant, the hu­man spe­cies pos­sesses the ca­pa­ci­ty for dis­tan­cing it­self from the fac­tors – more or less an­cho­red in na­ture – that shape man’s be­ha­viour, so that man can bring his ac­tions in­to line with free­ly cho­sen norms and tar­gets. The mo­ral sub­ject, cal­led the ‘per­son’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concer­ned, be go­ver­ned by ethi­cal prin­ciples. Al­though the per­son is sha­ped by a thou­sand and one fac­tors, Kant be­lieves there is en­ough free­dom left on which to base a sense of res­pon­si­bi­li­ty. This ample free­dom forms the foun­da­tion for man’s ethics. Next, he for­mu­lates an ethi­cal task: the per­son, whom he sees as an au­to­no­mous, ra­tio­nal and ac­coun­table sub­ject, must constant­ly cri­tique his own ac­tions and eva­luate them against the Law of Rea­son."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Na­ture has willed that man should pro­duce en­ti­re­ly by his own ini­tia­tive eve­ry­thing which goes beyond the me­cha­ni­cal or­de­ring of his ani­mal exis­tence’ (‘Idea for a Uni­ver­sal His­to­ry …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does eve­ry­thing by his own ef­forts, we shall see, ac­cor­ding to Kant, how in the long term even the see­min­gly most ran­dom pro­cesses will be­come re­gu­lar and constant. This leads to the reas­su­ring thought that people, pre­ci­se­ly when they choose to fol­low their own as op­po­sed to ano­ther’s path, are in­ad­ver­tent­ly gui­ded by na­ture. They then unin­ten­tio­nal­ly sup­port so­me­thing that, if they were aware of it, they would care lit­tle for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one ano­ther when they em­bo­dy their sub­jec­tive free­dom, but at the same time they will be cal­led upon to dis­ci­pline them­selves right across the na­tu­ral or­der of contra­dic­tions and va­rious forms of sel­fish self-in­vol­ve­ment. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its ori­gins in evil. For this rea­son, evil can be ac­cep­ted and de­fen­ded, and this consti­tutes the core of the pro­fane theo­di­cy Kant de­ve­lops in his text. He as­sumes there is an unin­ten­tio­nal, un­plan­ned com­ponent em­bed­ded in hu­man ac­tion. On that, he be­lieves, we can base the hope that there is a se­cret me­cha­nism at work in na­ture that will lead to a ba­lance in hu­man so­cie­ty. Des­pite the ma­ny de­tours re­sul­ting from the ci­vil rights of free­dom and equa­li­ty, there will be a ‘re­gu­lar pro­cess of im­pro­ve­ment’, which Kant be­lie­ved was confir­med by the French Re­vo­lu­tion (‘The Contest of Fa­cul­ties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant re­con­ciles, in the form of ‘conjec­tures ba­sed on rea­son’ or ‘pro­phe­cies of hu­man beings’ des­ti­ny’, the ma­ni­fest ran­dom­ness of hu­man af­fairs with a jus­ti­fi­ca­tion by na­ture. He be­lieves the mea­ning of his his­to­ri­cal pro­po­si­tion lies in the mo­ral ef­fects of the pro­mise that in the fu­ture free­dom and the vic­to­ry of good over evil will go hand in hand. The his­to­ri­cal fra­me­work thus helps him ground hu­man res­pon­si­bi­li­ty in the free­dom of sub­jec­ti­vi­ty. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant de­ve­lo­ped this phi­lo­so­phy be­cause he wants to see the state of na­ture and the law of the jungle make way for rea­so­nable or­der and the Law of Rea­son. The lat­ter are the op­po­site of a na­ture that Kant no lon­ger re­gards as a rea­so­nable or­de­ring, as was the case in An­ti­qui­ty, the Middle Ages and the pre­ce­ding clas­si­cal era. The state of na­ture is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theo­lo­gi­cal thought, that is, a place of vio­lence, was­te­ful­ness and the blind sub­ju­ga­tion of all things to the laws of ne­ces­si­ty. His new rea­so­nable or­der be­gins when the ‘per­son’ comes in­to being and suc­ceeds in tur­ning away from the state of na­ture. Kant then deems the ‘per­son’ free en­ough to es­ta­blish an or­der that is not ba­sed on eve­ry­bo­dy figh­ting eve­ry­bo­dy else, but on an ethos of mu­tual res­pect. Beyond the will to po­wer and the will to use the other – the uni­verse of uti­li­ty – Kant en­vi­sages the pos­si­bi­li­ty of man conclu­ding a pact with the other and mus­te­ring the willin­gness to ac­cept the re­sul­ting li­mi­ta­tions. Ac­cor­ding to Kant’s ethics, the free, his­to­ri­cal sub­ject is ca­pable of de­ve­lo­ping mo­tives for re­noun­cing ins­tant gra­ti­fi­ca­tion and the exer­cise of po­wer. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant al­so argues that the Law of Rea­son must be in­ter­pre­ted not on­ly as a tac­ti­cal ges­ture to se­cure one’s sur­vi­val, but as a ca­te­go­ri­cal im­pe­ra­tive, an un­con­di­tio­nal mo­ral law, which im­poses it­self on us as the ‘voice of conscious­ness’, whe­ther it is in our own in­ter­est or not. It is the his­to­ri­cal sub­ject’s rea­so­na­ble­ness that com­pels him to act in ac­cor­dance with the Law of Rea­son. Ul­ti­ma­te­ly, the bot­tom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achie­ving one’s own ends, but al­so as an end in it­self, to be ap­proa­ched with ac­cep­tance, ack­now­led­ge­ment and res­pect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This com­bi­na­tion of his­to­ri­cal re­pre­sen­ta­tion, concept of man and ethics holds a pro­mise that serves to get people to ac­cept their du­ty to an ‘in­ner mo­ra­li­ty’. His idea that this in­nate qua­li­ty, the good in man, is go­ver­ned by a ‘Di­vine Spark of God’, which gi­ven its depth and na­ture is es­sen­tial­ly beyond the reach of evil, be­trays Kant’s anar­cho-apo­ca­lyp­tic and gnos­tic ins­pi­ra­tion (See Taubes’ com­ments on Kant’s gnos­tic ins­pi­ra­tions in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Cri­ti­cal thin­kers in our day and age doubt whe­ther this his­to­ri­cal and mo­ral sub­jec­ti­vi­ty has any bea­ring on our condi­tion at the start of the third mil­len­nium. Hub Zwart, Dutch me­di­cal ethi­cist and Fou­cault ex­pert, is of the opi­nion that Kant’s thought has no re­le­vance for the dis­content ex­pe­rien­ced in to­day’s tech­no­cra­cy. In terms of spea­king and wri­ting, Kant’s thin­king en­cou­rages rea­so­ning and set­ting out one’s po­si­tion. It ef­fec­ti­ve­ly pro­hi­bits skir­ting around the are­na of ra­tio­nal dia­logue, which has be­come com­mon prac­tice in, for ins­tance, the me­dia and ad­ver­ti­sing. On the other hand, being ty­pi­cal at­tri­butes of mo­ral sub­jec­ti­vi­ty, rea­so­ning and set­ting out one’s po­si­tion have be­come ele­ments of an ins­tru­men­tal-nor­ma­tive, aca­de­mic way of thin­king ai­med at stee­ring people’s be­ha­viour. This type of thin­king the­re­by co­di­fies a prac­tice, which, in most cases, is no­thing other than a prac­tice of main­tai­ning a fine ba­lance bet­ween de­sire and in­ter­dic­tion, and it is doubt­ful whe­ther these forms of ad­dress are still ef­fec­tive in our post­mo­dern me­dia so­cie­ty. Against this, George Ba­taille and la­ter Mi­chel Fou­cault pit­ted a phi­lo­so­phy that mar­gi­na­lises rea­so­na­ble­ness and that can be sum­med up with the concepts as­ce­sis and fire. The first im­pe­ra­tive of this re­ne­wed ap­pre­cia­tion of Kan­tian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the pre­vai­ling re­gime of rea­son! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the in­tro­duc­tion of the confe­rence re­port Das Böse, Jen­seits von Ab­sich­ten und Tä­tern, oder: Ist der Teu­fel ins Sys­tem ein­ge­wan­dert? (Evil, Beyond In­ten­tions and Per­pe­tra­tors, or: Has the De­vil Slip­ped in­to the Sys­tem?, Röt­zer 1995), par­ti­ci­pants of the confe­rence like Wen­zel Ja­cob, Bernd Busch, Diet­mar Kam­per, Flo­rian Röt­zer, Pe­ter Wei­bel and Chris­toph Wulf a.o., won­der whe­ther, in our day and age, we can still be­lieve in Kant’s mo­ral sub­ject or whe­ther we are being suf­fo­ca­ted by a sense of res­pon­si­bi­li­ty that seems to be get­ting more and more ab­surd. We need to be­come more aware of the way mo­dern sys­tems work and de­ve­lop a sys­tems theo­ry, so they sug­gest, in which the res­pon­sible sub­ject is de­cen­tred and mar­gi­na­li­sed. We ought to create the pos­si­bi­li­ty to think in terms of a sys­tem that ope­rates au­to­no­mous­ly and of which the sub­ject is on­ly one (pas­sive) ele­ment. This sys­tem would be so com­plex and work in such a way that mo­ral man, com­pel­led by his free­dom to ful­fil his du­ty, would be­come more and more of a fic­tion in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Au­to­no­mous, self-res­pon­sible man – who was the goal of hu­ma­nism – has long since per­ished in our in­te­gra­ted, and high­ly struc­tu­ra­li­sed, or­ga­ni­sa­tions.’ (1995: p. 17) Psy­cho­tech­no­lo­gy and ra­tio­nal ma­na­ge­ment in­crea­sin­gly ba­nish mat­ters such as res­pon­si­bi­li­ty and com­pe­tence to wha­te­ver nar­row mar­gins re­main. This means that the evil conse­quences of such sys­tems no lon­ger ori­gi­nate in the ma­li­cious intent of a par­ti­cu­lar sub­ject; such an ex­pla­na­tion has, in any event, be­come com­ple­te­ly in­ade­quate. We must as­sume that the com­plex, high le­vel of or­ga­ni­sa­tion in such sys­tems means that even well-mea­ning ac­tions can have harm­ful conse­quences and that some ac­tions can have conse­quences that can­not be known at all. Thanks to these sys­tems there could well be such a thing as unin­ten­tio­nal evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unin­ten­tio­nal evil could be des­cri­bed as the out­come of the ex­tre­me­ly com­plex struc­tures through which so­cie­ty has or­ga­ni­sed both na­ture and people’s lives. Unin­ten­tio­nal evil is a fi­gure of thought cha­rac­te­ri­sed by the re­nun­cia­tion of all the hope (in a Kan­tian sense) that our so­cie­ty has in­ves­ted in the hu­ma­ni­sa­tion of na­ture and the na­tu­ra­li­sa­tion of man over the past two hun­dred years. Such a sys­te­ma­tic evil takes centre stage when the first and se­cond na­tures have, to a large extent, mer­ged. Unin­ten­tio­nal evil thrives on a na­ture that can ba­re­ly be dis­tin­gui­shed from the so­cie­ties that en­gi­neer and control it and that have in­crea­sin­gly in­cor­po­ra­ted it in­to their pro­cesses for en­su­ring sur­vi­val. The oc­cur­rence of an unin­ten­tio­nal sys­tem evil could then be so­me­thing like the late re­venge of a na­ture that has lost its sta­tus of other­ness and now im­poses its laws and or­der on so­cie­ty as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil des­troys. Can this the­sis be re­ver­sed or chal­len­ged? Yes, since no­wa­days we have mo­dern emergent theo­ries that view the tra­di­tio­nal ele­ments of evil, such as chance, ac­ci­dent and er­ror, as ge­ne­ra­tive forces. These theo­ries ac­cept that chance, ac­ci­dent and er­ror are the ma­ni­fes­ta­tions of the crea­tive po­wer of mat­ter. For that rea­son com­plex sys­tems, whose ef­fects and forms can be in­ter­pre­ted with the help of chao­tic pro­cesses, ca­tas­trophes and emer­gen­cies, are in­com­pa­tible with Kant’s ethics and te­leo­lo­gy. When we rea­lise the im­por­tant role that chance – for scien­ti­fic me­ta­phy­sics the most im­por­tant ca­te­go­ry of evil – now plays in mo­dern bio­lo­gy and phy­sics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connec­tion with man’s ac­tions and in­ten­tions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We can­not prevent evil by doing good. Chance, ac­ci­dent and er­ror can­not be so­le­ly in­ter­pre­ted as cor­rup­tio, as si­gns of mo­ral de­cay or of the de­cline of so­me­thing good, as was po­si­ted in the eigh­teenth cen­tu­ry; chance is a fea­ture co­ming from the beyond and fa­tal­ly crosses all concep­tual forms that seek to im­pose or­der on chaos and the cos­mos. For that rea­son alone, it has al­ways been seen as a prin­ciple of evil. Be­cause of the way chance func­tions in our net­work so­cie­ty, in our com­plex, connec­tive and hea­vi­ly in­te­gra­ted sys­tems (the or­ga­ni­sa­tion of la­bour, pro­fes­sio­nal net­works, com­pu­ter net­works, mo­bile phones, the me­dia, etc.), the sub­ject has lit­tle or no control over the ef­fects of his own ac­tions. This fact ren­ders res­pon­si­bi­li­ty mea­nin­gless, while at the same time bur­de­ning us, in­con­tro­ver­ti­bly, with a so­cie­ty that has be­come ef­fec­ti­ve­ly un­go­ver­nable – per­haps pre­ci­se­ly be­cause of this ex­ces­sive in­te­gra­tion. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What in­ter­ests us about this way of thin­king are the theses it ge­ne­rates about the birth of the me­tro­po­lis and the role of ur­ba­nism. Could the un­go­ver­na­bi­li­ty of the mo­dern me­tro­po­lis and its wild mu­ta­tion in­to to­day’s mons­tro­si­ty be the re­sult of the de­ploy­ment of tech­no­lo­gies, or bet­ter still, the side ef­fects of tech­no­lo­gies, that were meant to ‘save’ the ci­ty? The most pro­noun­ced ‘fa­tal’ re­scue ope­ra­tion for doing so has pro­ba­bly been the in­tro­duc­tion of mo­to­ri­sed traf­fic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Ha­ving re­flec­ted on sys­tem er­ror and chance, the par­ti­ci­pants of the confe­rence Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a post­mo­dern stra­te­gy. They plead for ethi­cal in­dif­fe­rence. They plead for a do­main beyond good and evil, where one can ac­ti­vate so­me­thing beyond all in­ten­tion, beyond all plan­ning, beyond any le­gi­ti­ma­tion. We can in­deed ge­ne­rate so­me­thing new here on earth. And this does not re­quire the re­jec­tion of Kant’s ethi­cal dua­lism, since all of our ac­tions, all of our thin­king, de­si­gning, wri­ting and rea­li­sing is ‘ir­res­pon­sible‘ by de­fi­ni­tion, be­cause we can­not avoid being ‘sub­mer­ged’ in the in­for­ma­tion flows. As post­mo­dern cos­mo­po­li­tans we are hy­per-in­for­med, but those ve­ry same flows that in­form us are al­so the flows that make it im­pos­sible for us to trans­cend and ob­tain an over­view of the world. This is why the pro­po­sed ethi­cal in­dif­fe­rence seeks not to in­cite us to neo-Nietz­schean he­roics, but ra­ther to alert us to the tra­gic rea­li­sa­tion that we are doo­med to ir­res­pon­si­bi­li­ty and condem­ned to the last pas­si­vi­ty that per­vades all of post-mo­der­ni­ty: Wha­te­ver we do, our ac­tions are al­ways sha­do­wed by the unin­ten­tio­nal; eve­ry­thing is al­ways dif­ferent than an­ti­ci­pa­ted. Whe­re­ver so­me­thing un­fo­re­seen arises, whe­re­ver so­me­thing hap­pens, whe­re­ver an emer­gence oc­curs, the sys­tem it­self is at work, the sys­tem it­self is the ac­tor, and we… we ex­pe­rience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" FCOLOR="t" CH="Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" FCOLOR="t" CH="Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" FCOLOR="t" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="Litt"/>
            <breakframe/>
            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" FCOLOR="t" CH="Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="Litt"/>
            <breakframe/>
            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" FCOLOR="t" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
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            <ITEXT CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
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            <ITEXT FONTSIZE="10" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of "/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical "/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
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            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
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            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of "/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FONT="EB Garamond 12 Regular" FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical "/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784) and, ‘The Contest of the Faculties’ (1798), in: Kant: Political Writings, edited by E.S. Reis, translated by H.S. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1970) 1991."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Kant, I., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), translated and edited by Robert B. Louden, with an introduction by Manfred Kuehn. Cambridge, UK/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Rötzer, F. (Ed.), Das Böse: jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?), Göttingen: Steidl, 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH=" Taubes, J., Occidental Eschatology. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Zwart, H., Technocratie en onbehagen: de plaats van de ethiek in het werk van Michel Foucault (Technocracy and its discontents: the place of ethics in the work of Michel Foucault), Nijmegen: SUN 1995."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="III. Appendix 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there could well be such a thing as unintentional evil."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="This unintentional evil could be described as the outcome of the extremely complex structures through which society has organised both nature and people’s lives. Unintentional evil is a figure of thought characterised by the renunciation of all the hope (in a Kantian sense) that our society has invested in the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man over the past two hundred years. Such a systematic evil takes centre stage when the first and second natures have, to a large extent, merged. Unintentional evil thrives on a nature that can barely be distinguished from the societies that engineer and control it and that have increasingly incorporated it into their processes for ensuring survival. The occurrence of an unintentional system evil could then be something like the late revenge of a nature that has lost its status of otherness and now imposes its laws and order on society as a whole. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Good creates and evil destroys. Can this thesis be reversed or challenged? Yes, since nowadays we have modern emergent theories that view the traditional elements of evil, such as chance, accident and error, as generative forces. These theories accept that chance, accident and error are the manifestations of the creative power of matter. For that reason complex systems, whose effects and forms can be interpreted with the help of chaotic processes, catastrophes and emergencies, are incompatible with Kant’s ethics and teleology. When we realise the important role that chance – for scientific metaphysics the most important category of evil – now plays in modern biology and physics, then it does not make sense to confine evil to its connection with man’s actions and intentions. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="We cannot prevent evil by doing good. Chance, accident and error cannot be solely interpreted as corruptio, as signs of moral decay or of the decline of something good, as was posited in the eighteenth century; chance is a feature coming from the beyond and fatally crosses all conceptual forms that seek to impose order on chaos and the cosmos. For that reason alone, it has always been seen as a principle of evil. Because of the way chance functions in our network society, in our complex, connective and heavily integrated systems (the organisation of labour, professional networks, computer networks, mobile phones, the media, etc.), the subject has little or no control over the effects of his own actions. This fact renders responsibility meaningless, while at the same time burdening us, incontrovertibly, with a society that has become effectively ungovernable – perhaps precisely because of this excessive integration. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="What interests us about this way of thinking are the theses it generates about the birth of the metropolis and the role of urbanism. Could the ungovernability of the modern metropolis and its wild mutation into today’s monstrosity be the result of the deployment of technologies, or better still, the side effects of technologies, that were meant to ‘save’ the city? The most pronounced ‘fatal’ rescue operation for doing so has probably been the introduction of motorised traffic. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Having reflected on system error and chance, the participants of the conference Das Böse (The Evil) plead for a postmodern strategy. They plead for ethical indifference. They plead for a domain beyond good and evil, where one can activate something beyond all intention, beyond all planning, beyond any legitimation. We can indeed generate something new here on earth. And this does not require the rejection of Kant’s ethical dualism, since all of our actions, all of our thinking, designing, writing and realising is ‘irresponsible‘ by definition, because we cannot avoid being ‘submerged’ in the information flows. As postmodern cosmopolitans we are hyper-informed, but those very same flows that inform us are also the flows that make it impossible for us to transcend and obtain an overview of the world. This is why the proposed ethical indifference seeks not to incite us to neo-Nietzschean heroics, but rather to alert us to the tragic realisation that we are doomed to irresponsibility and condemned to the last passivity that pervades all of post-modernity: Whatever we do, our actions are always shadowed by the unintentional; everything is always different than anticipated. Wherever something unforeseen arises, wherever something happens, wherever an emergence occurs, the system itself is at work, the system itself is the actor, and we… we experience it, watch it and… feed it."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="fig. 4 "/>
            <para PARENT="number"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Can We Still Be Responsible?"/>
            <para PARENT="book 3 titre"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘The fact that the human can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person’ (Kant 1798: p. 15). This is one of Immanuel Kants central assertions in Anthropology. In the introduction of the same work he states: ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply [(his) acquired knowledge and skill] is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. — Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). Finally, in Anthropology we read, ‘Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being, pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’ (Kant 1798: p. 3). The capacity for self-awareness Kant identifies here, this capacity to relate to himself, the fact that he is both subject and object of his knowledge and actions, forms the basis of his proposed ethical practice. Thanks to this capacity for self-awareness, we can analyse ourselves and study the factors that shape our behaviour, before taking control of our own lives and accepting responsibility for our behaviour. That is how we assert ourselves as moral subjects. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="According to Kant, the human species possesses the capacity for distancing itself from the factors – more or less anchored in nature – that shape man’s behaviour, so that man can bring his actions into line with freely chosen norms and targets. The moral subject, called the ‘person’ by Kant, can, as far as Kant is concerned, be governed by ethical principles. Although the person is shaped by a thousand and one factors, Kant believes there is enough freedom left on which to base a sense of responsibility. This ample freedom forms the foundation for man’s ethics. Next, he formulates an ethical task: the person, whom he sees as an autonomous, rational and accountable subject, must constantly critique his own actions and evaluate them against the Law of Reason."/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ (‘Idea for a Universal History …’Kant 1784 (1991): p. 43). When man does everything by his own efforts, we shall see, according to Kant, how in the long term even the seemingly most random processes will become regular and constant. This leads to the reassuring thought that people, precisely when they choose to follow their own as opposed to another’s path, are inadvertently guided by nature. They then unintentionally support something that, if they were aware of it, they would care little for. With this Kant confirms that people can harm one another when they embody their subjective freedom, but at the same time they will be called upon to discipline themselves right across the natural order of contradictions and various forms of selfish self-involvement. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="For Kant good has its origins in evil. For this reason, evil can be accepted and defended, and this constitutes the core of the profane theodicy Kant develops in his text. He assumes there is an unintentional, unplanned component embedded in human action. On that, he believes, we can base the hope that there is a secret mechanism at work in nature that will lead to a balance in human society. Despite the many detours resulting from the civil rights of freedom and equality, there will be a ‘regular process of improvement’, which Kant believed was confirmed by the French Revolution (‘The Contest of Faculties’, 1798 (Kant 1798 (1991): p. 176 ff.). It is thus that Kant reconciles, in the form of ‘conjectures based on reason’ or ‘prophecies of human beings’ destiny’, the manifest randomness of human affairs with a justification by nature. He believes the meaning of his historical proposition lies in the moral effects of the promise that in the future freedom and the victory of good over evil will go hand in hand. The historical framework thus helps him ground human responsibility in the freedom of subjectivity. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant developed this philosophy because he wants to see the state of nature and the law of the jungle make way for reasonable order and the Law of Reason. The latter are the opposite of a nature that Kant no longer regards as a reasonable ordering, as was the case in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the preceding classical era. The state of nature is to Kant what the ‘world’ was to theological thought, that is, a place of violence, wastefulness and the blind subjugation of all things to the laws of necessity. His new reasonable order begins when the ‘person’ comes into being and succeeds in turning away from the state of nature. Kant then deems the ‘person’ free enough to establish an order that is not based on everybody fighting everybody else, but on an ethos of mutual respect. Beyond the will to power and the will to use the other – the universe of utility – Kant envisages the possibility of man concluding a pact with the other and mustering the willingness to accept the resulting limitations. According to Kant’s ethics, the free, historical subject is capable of developing motives for renouncing instant gratification and the exercise of power. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Kant also argues that the Law of Reason must be interpreted not only as a tactical gesture to secure one’s survival, but as a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral law, which imposes itself on us as the ‘voice of consciousness’, whether it is in our own interest or not. It is the historical subject’s reasonableness that compels him to act in accordance with the Law of Reason. Ultimately, the bottom line of Kant’s ethics is that the other should be seen not just as a means to achieving one’s own ends, but also as an end in itself, to be approached with acceptance, acknowledgement and respect (Cf. Zwart 1995: pp. 25, 26 and 32). This combination of historical representation, concept of man and ethics holds a promise that serves to get people to accept their duty to an ‘inner morality’. His idea that this innate quality, the good in man, is governed by a ‘Divine Spark of God’, which given its depth and nature is essentially beyond the reach of evil, betrays Kant’s anarcho-apocalyptic and gnostic inspiration (See Taubes’ comments on Kant’s gnostic inspirations in Taubes 2009: pp. 145-146). "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Critical thinkers in our day and age doubt whether this historical and moral subjectivity has any bearing on our condition at the start of the third millennium. Hub Zwart, Dutch medical ethicist and Foucault expert, is of the opinion that Kant’s thought has no relevance for the discontent experienced in today’s technocracy. In terms of speaking and writing, Kant’s thinking encourages reasoning and setting out one’s position. It effectively prohibits skirting around the arena of rational dialogue, which has become common practice in, for instance, the media and advertising. On the other hand, being typical attributes of moral subjectivity, reasoning and setting out one’s position have become elements of an instrumental-normative, academic way of thinking aimed at steering people’s behaviour. This type of thinking thereby codifies a practice, which, in most cases, is nothing other than a practice of maintaining a fine balance between desire and interdiction, and it is doubtful whether these forms of address are still effective in our postmodern media society. Against this, George Bataille and later Michel Foucault pitted a philosophy that marginalises reasonableness and that can be summed up with the concepts ascesis and fire. The first imperative of this renewed appreciation of Kantian ethics is: "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="Think against the prevailing regime of reason! "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="In the introduction of the conference report Das Böse, Jenseits von Absichten und Tätern, oder: Ist der Teufel ins System eingewandert? (Evil, Beyond Intentions and Perpetrators, or: Has the Devil Slipped into the System?, Rötzer 1995), participants of the conference like Wenzel Jacob, Bernd Busch, Dietmar Kamper, Florian Rötzer, Peter Weibel and Christoph Wulf a.o., wonder whether, in our day and age, we can still believe in Kant’s moral subject or whether we are being suffocated by a sense of responsibility that seems to be getting more and more absurd. We need to become more aware of the way modern systems work and develop a systems theory, so they suggest, in which the responsible subject is decentred and marginalised. We ought to create the possibility to think in terms of a system that operates autonomously and of which the subject is only one (passive) element. This system would be so complex and work in such a way that moral man, compelled by his freedom to fulfil his duty, would become more and more of a fiction in it. "/>
            <para PARENT="book3"/>
            <ITEXT FCOLOR="Black" CH="‘Autonomous, self-responsible man – who was the goal of humanism – has long since perished in our integrated, and highly structuralised, organisations.’ (1995: p. 17) Psychotechnology and rational management increasingly banish matters such as responsibility and competence to whatever narrow margins remain. This means that the evil consequences of such systems no longer originate in the malicious intent of a particular subject; such an explanation has, in any event, become completely inadequate. We must assume that the complex, high level of organisation in such systems means that even well-meaning actions can have harmful consequences and that some actions can have consequences that cannot be known at all. Thanks to these systems there co